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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its creation in 1995, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) critics 
and supporters have agreed on two things: there has been a surprising amount 
of judicial lawmaking1 and an equally surprising lack of success at advancing a 
broad trade “deal” among members. This article focuses on judicial lawmaking 
and argues that in some circumstances, decisions rendered by court-like bodies 
in the WTO are adhered to even when the same policy would not gain support 
in multilateral negotiations. In this sense, the two may be thought of as 
substitutes. Why? As U.S. expectations of reciprocity with developing countries 
have increased, and as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)/WTO system has expanded in number and type of members, 
consensus-building to legislate new deals has become increasingly difficult, 
reflecting the often-conflicting constituent interests brought to the table.2 As the 
prospects for broad legislative rulemaking have declined, judicial lawmaking 
has become more common, especially through interpretation of unclear rules 
and the filling of gaps in WTO agreements. Such lawmaking has been 
particularly evident in cases challenging subsidies or countervailing measures, 
anti-dumping duties, and safeguards measures, and has had considerable effects 
on the steel sector and agriculture. Adherence to such liberalizing judicial 
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 1. “Judicial lawmaking” is defined as action by a judicial body that establishes new legal rules. 
Such action is usually taken pursuant to a court’s perceived authority to interpret legal text. A court 
may take a restrained or expansive stance on interpretation, leading to variance in the extent of judicial 
lawmaking. As elaborated in Part II, below, judicial lawmaking at the WTO is done by the Appellate 
Body. WTO judicial lawmaking is treated here as having two dimensions: filling gaps in legal text and 
clarifying ambiguity. 
 2. For a more detailed explanation of increasing stalemate in WTO trade rounds, see Judith L. 
Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: The Rise of Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, in 
THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., forthcoming 2008). 
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action is surprising, since the same trade liberalization could face domestic 
resistance in the context of legislative trade negotiations. 
In this article, we examine the question of judicial lawmaking and adherence 
to dispute-settlement decisions in the context of overall delegation to the 
GATT/WTO. The notion of delegation used here is drawn from Terry Moe, 
who argues that “[t]he principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the 
agency relationship, in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a 
contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent 
will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the 
principal.”3 As noted by Bradley and Kelley in this issue, the institutional effect 
of such delegation is to change the incentives of all parties and, as they note, 
may lead to a “sovereignty cost.”4 We consider the case of delegation to the 
secretariat, but focus on dispute resolution in the WTO Appellate Body; we 
assume that the relationship among the principals of the GATT/WTO, that is, 
its member nations or customs territories, always held some degree of a 
principal–agent relationship with the central administrative structures. Even 
though the membership exerted far more oversight over the secretariat than is 
found in most other international economic agencies, an agency relationship did 
develop with a nascent secretariat in the mid-1950s and after 1995 grew with the 
establishment of the contemporary dispute-settlement system. What we suggest, 
however, is that it is not necessary to think of the relationship as “binding.” It 
has always been understood that the principals may, in practice, renege on 
agreements made by the collective, including informal opinions by the legal 
office of the secretariat as well as formal decisions of the dispute-settlement 
process.  
As opposed to international organizations created in the same period, such 
as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the founders of 
the early GATT never intended to delegate authority to a central agent. 
Rather, delegation was an unintended byproduct of the creation of an 
underspecified set of rules and procedures, first by the delegates who created 
the GATT in 1947, and later by those who participated in its reinvention as the 
WTO in 1995. There has been no de jure delegation to the regime in the sense 
that most countries have not given up legal authority under domestic law to 
maintain trade rules they deem appropriate. But there is “behavioral” 
delegation, meaning that countries have de facto begun to act as if they have 
given authority to the regime.5 
This form of delegation has had lasting effects, and the functioning of the 
secretariat and the dispute-settlement system should be viewed in this context. 
 
 3. Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 756 (1984). 
 4. Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 27 (Winter 2008) (quoting Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 436–37 (2000)). 
 5. For more on the distinction between formal or de jure sovereignty and informal or de facto 
sovereignty, see Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 329, 340 (2004). 
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In particular, behavioral delegation may have enabled judicial activism as an 
unintended and imperfect substitute for liberalization through legislative action. 
Through judicial action, the dispute-settlement system (and the secretariat’s 
influence on dispute-settlement panel reports) has been able to define and 
redefine trade rules so as to keep markets open. But whereas the actions of 
panels, the Appellate Body, and the secretariat appear to be consistent with 
their liberal world views, the absence of de jure delegation makes the high 
degree of national adherence to these judicial decisions a puzzle that begs for 
explanation. 
This article focuses on this puzzle of adherence to judicial decisions by the 
most powerful member of the WTO—the United States. We argue that, given 
the configuration of domestic interests in the United States, judicial compliance 
is not surprising. Rather, even when powerful domestic sectors seem to have an 
effective veto over liberalization in trade rounds, the rules and procedures 
brought to bear in complying with the WTO’s judicial decisions reconfigure 
domestic coalitions in ways that favor liberalization long thought unimaginable. 
Liberalization is occurring, not because of delegated sovereignty, but because 
judicial actions are reconfiguring the relative power of domestic actors. Looking 
back, similarities are evident between the role of the WTO’s judicial arm and 
the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) liberalizing role in the early days of the 
European Union (EU). 
The article begins with a review of delegation in the GATT/WTO and the 
rise of judicial lawmaking. Next, it examines the court’s actions and offers a 
one-dimensional preference space model, described below, that illustrates why 
U.S. compliance may be expected. Finally, it concludes with some general 
observations on the issue of sovereignty costs in the GATT/WTO regime. 
II 
DELEGATION IN THE GATT/WTO 
When the United States invited fifteen nations to join in an initial round of 
trade talks in 1946, participants did not expect the meeting to yield the rules and 
procedures for commercial policy that would regulate trade for the subsequent 
century. Rather, participants were looking ahead to what was the draft of the 
forthcoming Havana Charter,6 which would have established the International 
Trade Organization (ITO), as the document that would specify the procedural 
rules and governance of the new regime. When agreeing to the interim 
agreement, the Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT,7 participants 
assumed that the regime’s rules and procedures were short-term and paid scant 
attention to the structure and procedures of the new organization. The GATT 
 
 6. Final Act of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for an 
International Trade Organization, chs. VII–IX, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948) [hereinafter 
Havana Charter]. 
 7. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 
1947, 61 Stat. A–2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308 [hereinafter Protocol of Provisional Application]. 
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structure did survive, however, and with minimal changes over the following 
decades. This absence of detailed procedural rules and the lack of a consensus 
on the scope of the trade organization influenced the trajectory of the trade 
regime in two fundamental ways. 
First, because of this unusual history, the relationship between the principals 
(states and customs territories) and an agent (initially, the secretariat) has 
remained under-defined throughout GATT/WTO history. In fact, many would 
say that thinking in these terms is misleading because the organization was 
always “member-driven.” The early GATT did not even have a secretariat per 
se since the creators envisioned the organization as a treaty and not as an 
international organization.8 But from the start, there needed to be at least a 
small central governance structure: what was called a “secretariat” for almost 
fifty years was formally a staff under the executive secretary of the Interim 
Commission for the ITO; the GATT contracting parties called this executive 
secretary their “Director-General.” By the 1980s, that structure had grown into 
numerous divisions with a separate legal office. Yet it was not until the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO9 that the secretariat was formally created and 
the structure of rule adjudication, in the form of a judiciary, was more fully 
defined.10 
Second, liberalization at the international level has occurred within a regime 
that never fully settled the basic procedural issues accompanying the setting of 
trade policy. From the beginning, the GATT liberalized episodically through 
trade rounds.11 In each round and within each negotiating country, 
protectionists threatened with near-certain economic loss from liberalization 
joined together to make sure they were not on the chopping block. Each nation 
devised different mechanisms by which to circumvent protectionist interests at 
home, with the result that liberalization rounds were highly polarized and 
occurred under the shadow of politics at home. Deals were precarious, and 
politicians needed to worry about whether they could find support at home for 
agreements signed in Geneva. 
These negotiating procedures became increasingly problematic in the 1980s, 
due first to the rapid increase in the number of nations participating in the 
regime and, second, to increasing efforts to discipline behind-the-border 
 
 8. See generally Richard Blackhurst, The Capacity of the WTO to Fulfill Its Mandate, in THE WTO 
AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 31 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998). In a comparative analysis of 
international organizations, Blackhurst concludes that the GATT/WTO has had a small and 
underfinanced secretariat. Id. at 41. He notes that the only agency with a smaller staff and budget 
among the seventeen most active international agencies is the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. Id. at 40, tbl.1.1. 
 9. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 10. The secretariat remained under formal UN control until the WTO’s creation. Thus, through 
the mid-1990s, the UN was the legal entity that could appoint the Director-General and set 
compensation. 
 11. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 201–48 (1969) 
(discussing “The Legal Framework of Tariff Concessions and Negotiations in GATT”). 
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measures. Enlarged membership and an expanded agenda made it more 
difficult to legislate liberalization. As evidenced by the Doha Round, it has 
become difficult to reach consensus on anything other than general principles. 
This inability to specify detailed rules and procedures on trade opened the 
door for increased de facto delegation to the secretariat over the course of the 
GATT years and for considerable de facto delegation to the dispute-settlement 
system since the creation of the WTO. 
A. Delegation to the Secretariat 
In theory, the GATT/WTO secretariat is granted limited independence 
from the membership, and the Director–General, chosen by a consensus of the 
members, is given little real authority. The members have stated clearly that 
autonomy might lead the organization to promote policies inconsistent with 
political pressures at home, a problem of particular importance for the more 
powerful nations participating in the regime. As a result, the members of the 
secretariat rarely chair committees; and the growth in the number of 
professionals, as opposed to support staff, has been far less than expected, given 
the rapid increase in membership. But even with these constraints, delegation 
occurred; the inability of the membership to concur easily on comprehensive 
and detailed rules, both for trade policy and the specific scope of the 
secretariat’s powers, led to more autonomy than most countries would have 
wanted. As with all agents, those in Geneva had an often differing position from 
the membership on trade matters: they consistently advocated for more open 
markets. 
The growth in the secretariat’s functions is not surprising. As the demands 
on the organization increased to both provide information on trade practices 
and support the process of trade liberalization, the secretariat was forced to 
perform more functions and become the legal memory of the regime. The 
secretariat performs at least three functions that have been delegated de facto 
by the members. 
First, the secretariat is the keeper of information. Not only does it collect 
and disseminate data provided by members to others in the organization, but it 
also collates and organizes—and often creates—the data sets on trade flows and 
trade restrictions used as bases for trade round negotiations. 
Second, the secretariat plays a key role in dispute settlement. Even though 
members do not allow cases to be based formally on precedent (that is, while 
precedent is highly persuasive, there is no stare decisis), the secretariat helps 
assure the intellectual continuity of panel decisions. Even with no formal legal 
role, members of the secretariat influence decisions through advice to panel 
participants and recommendations on written panel reports. The effect has been 
generally consistent panel reports and far fewer decisions that would be 
politically difficult to administer. Particularly through the dispute-settlement 
panel stage, the secretariat is the collective memory of the organization: 
understanding the political pressures of members, it serves to mediate the 
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dispute process and increase the likelihood that decisions resonate with political 
realities. 
Third, the secretariat provides support for small developing nations in both 
rounds and in dispute-settlement cases. The regime provides training for 
government officials on how to interpret rules and how to stay in compliance 
with these rules.12 Training sessions both transfer information and socialize the 
trade officials of new members to support the underlying purposes of the 
regime. Past employees of the secretariat advise developing countries on a 
range of activities, from dispute-panel processes to the collection of appropriate 
information for trade talks to reform proposals on how to increase their voice in 
the organization. While the larger nations can rely on expertise at home, 
smaller and developing economies rely more extensively on the secretariat for 
support. 
Further, whereas the first director–generals were selected because of their 
expertise as international civil servants, the most recent appointees have 
political, rather than technical, backgrounds. The lack of expertise at the top of 
the organization, either in economics or in international law, has created a 
widening division between the professional staff and the political leadership. 
Because the Office of the Director-General relies upon the permanent staff for 
support, its relationship with the civil service has become increasingly strained 
over time. This is not to suggest that power resides in the Director-General’s 
office. Its personnel are as constrained by the membership as is the secretariat. 
Still, the relationship between the professional staff and the Director-General’s 
office has evolved with changes in the organization. Whereas the early 
secretariat saw the Director–General as its representative to the contracting 
parties, the more politicized relationship of recent years has led the secretariat 
to view the Director–General’s office as pursuing interests often at odds with 
the more liberal policies being promoted by the professional staff. 
The mantra among the staff and the members of the WTO is that the 
organization is “member-driven,” but the reality of a complex organization 
supported by an educated and sophisticated staff is not entirely consistent with 
this image. Institutional change has had unanticipated effects on the 
organization; and given that the rules of the WTO became more complex and 
inclusive, some agent had to be entrusted with the job of maintaining the 
institutional memory important to interpreting rules and monitoring the 
evolution of members’ trade policy. Unintentionally, the role of the secretariat 
expanded, even as the membership attempted to keep the bureaucracy in a 
subservient role and as the leadership became more a political position and less 
one entrusted to an individual with trade expertise. 
 
 12. See generally World Trade Organization, Aid For Trade Global Review, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/global_review_e.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008) 
(describing the WTO’s goals for monitoring and evaluation of its “Global Aid-for-Trade Review” 
program). 
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B. Judicial Delegation: How Did It Occur and Is It Binding? 
The WTO’s dispute-settlement rules and processes were an attempt to 
reform problems in the GATT’s dispute-settlement rules and processes. The 
GATT had been created to facilitate bargaining among participants over the 
regulation and liberalization of trade policy. Although created with the concern 
that contracting parties live up to their promises, the mechanism for oversight 
of rule adherence depended upon a contracting party, in the name of a 
producer, complaining about a violation. The secretariat had neither oversight 
nor judicial power. Although the secretariat compiled data on trade practices 
starting in 1989 by means of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), the 
data in these reports constituted neither formal grounds for a dispute nor legal 
evidence of a country’s trade practices.13 Monitoring occurred through oversight 
by individual contracting parties; when a complaint was filed, the secretariat 
assisted with forming a panel. If the panel found in favor of the complainant, 
and the respondent did not block a consensus to adopt the panel report, then 
the contravening party was required to change its behavior.14 In the absence of a 
change in practice, little could be done other than sanction retaliation—though 
that, too, required a consensus.15 
The weakness of the GATT dispute-settlement procedure, the “panel 
procedure,” became increasingly apparent in the 1980s. In the early years of 
GATT, from 1948 through 1959, contracting parties brought relatively few 
(fifty-three) legal complaints against each other.16 The panel procedure was 
developed in these years,17 and it was used in over half of these cases.18 As the 
number of contracting parties grew, the number of conflicts increased. Perhaps 
reflecting dissatisfaction with the settlement procedures, the number of formal 
complaints did not rise and, in fact, fell after 1963. Whereas almost sixty cases 
were dealt with by the dispute-settlement process through 1963, only one new 
case was brought forward through 1970.19 Hudec argued the issue was 
legitimacy—the process was viewed as unfair.20 Legitimate or not, the caseload 
 
 13. See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 9, Annex 3 (describing the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism). 
 14. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the 
Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 62 (1997). See generally Improvements to the GATT 
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Apr. 13, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.), at 61 (1990) 
[hereinafter Midterm Dispute-Settlement Rules], available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/ 
SULPDF/91420188.pdf. 
 15. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. XXIII(2), XXV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? 
Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 344 (2002). 
 16. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 11 (1993). 
 17. Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three 
Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 4–5 (1999). 
 18. HUDEC, supra note 16, at 12. 
 19. See id. at 13. 
 20. See Hudec, supra note 17, at 21. 
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increased in the 1970s to a total of thirty-two,21 and in the 1980s the panel 
process began to be invoked regularly.22 Of the 115 complaints filed in the 1980s, 
forty-seven led to panel reports.23 However, only about two-fifths of rulings for 
the complainant resulted in full compliance by the respondent.24 Nonetheless, 
the increased caseload forced the secretariat to create a separate legal division, 
which had the effect of encouraging even more legal complaints.25 As the 
number, visibility, and importance of cases increased, so too did the number of 
cases in which consensus was blocked. 
During the 1970s and ‘80s, in response to a growing trade deficit, 
perceptions of unfair trade practices abroad, and frustration with the sclerotic 
GATT dispute-settlement system, the United States turned increasingly to 
domestic law to deal with its trade disputes. Specifically, a “unilateral” 
approach to addressing trade disputes was enacted by the U.S. Congress in the 
form of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.26 Section 301 permits (and in some 
cases requires) the President to impose retaliatory trade sanctions on countries 
engaging in any practice that “burdens or restricts United States commerce” 
and is “unjustifiable,” “discriminatory,” or “unreasonable”27—as determined by 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR).28 Thus, when a 
foreign government blocked the GATT dispute-settlement process, the U.S. 
government often found itself in a position of threatening unilateral trade 
retaliation against that government unless it agreed to change its trade practices 
in accordance with Washington’s demands. This approach to the settlement of 
trade disputes was not viewed favorably by the rest of the world. 
Perhaps as part of an attempt to credibly commit to the regime in the post-
Cold War days or in response to growing criticism of American intransigence in 
a number of foreign policy arenas, the United States championed a change in 
dispute-settlement procedures.29 In 1989, the United States supported a new 
dispute-settlement understanding adopted in the Midterm Review of the 
Uruguay Round;30 in the next year the United States heralded an even more 
radical change in the rules. The underlying theme was that it was time for 
member nations to agree to give up their right to block a consensus in the 
establishment of panels, the adoption of panel reports, and authorization of 
retaliation. Initially, the U.S. position aligned closely with Canada’s but not with 
 
 21. HUDEC, supra note 16, at 13. 
 22. See id. at 8. 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 457, 
473 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002). 
 25. HUDEC, supra note 16, at 13. 
 26. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000). 
 27. Id. § 2411(a),(b). 
 28. Id. § 2411(a)(1). 
 29. For more details on this argument, see Judith Goldstein & Joanne Gowa, U.S. National Power 
and the Post-War Trading Regime, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 153, 158–64 (2002). 
 30. See generally Midterm Dispute-Settlement Rules, supra note 14. 
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those of the other Quad members—Japan and the European Union. The U.S. 
proposal not only included the automatic adoption of panel reports, but it also 
created a right to appeal to a new WTO Appellate Body whose purpose was to 
oversee the work of panels on questions of law.31 The time limits established in 
this process would be modeled on the United States’ own Section 301 statute. 
For the United States, this seemingly radical position was contingent on a 
crucial proviso—that the substantive rules adopted in the Uruguay Round had 
to be adequately specific and reflect U.S. policy objectives.32 
At home, increased delegation under these terms was argued to be 
consistent with American interests: the United States would remain more often 
in compliance with WTO rules that reflected its interests and policy objectives 
than would its trading partners. If the WTO’s substantive rules were to the 
United States’ liking, and the dispute-settlement procedures were both 
consistent with the timeline for action under Section 301 and could ultimately 
authorize retaliation for noncompliance, then a more legalized WTO dispute-
settlement system would legitimize U.S. use of its market power to pressure 
other countries to comply with its trade-policy objectives.33 Tellingly, the United 
States shifted to this position on dispute-settlement reform at the end of 1990, 
which is the same time that it reached agreement with the European 
Communities (EC) to impose the results of the Uruguay Round on developing 
countries via the “single undertaking.”34 Few nations agreed with the U.S. 
analysis of who would end up in front of panels. But curbing U.S. unilateralism 
was one of the most salient elements in both Japan’s and the EC’s publicly 
stated interest in the Round, and both endorsed the reforms. 
In the end, the new procedures occupied twenty-four pages of text, 
elaborating a process that is more complex and precise than in the past and that 
covers all areas of WTO agreements and state behavior subject thereto, which 
would include U.S.-imposed trade sanctions pursuant to Section 301. The 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)35 is far more obligatory, automatic, 
and apolitical than the GATT rules. The effect of the change—a vast increase in 
use of the DSU—was far broader than anticipated in any commentary of the 
time. Although 452 dispute-settlement complaints were filed in the forty-six 
 
 31. This description of the U.S. position in 1990 is documented in USTR, Dispute Settlement, in 
THE U.S. DELEGATION BRIEFING BOOK FOR THE BRUSSELS MINISTERIAL (Dec. 1990) (on file with 
authors). 
 32. Id. 
 33. “Legalization” is a particular form of institutionalization characterized by precision, obligation, 
and delegation. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-
Marie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L. ORG. 401 (2000). 
 34. See Steinberg, supra note 15, at 359–60. 
 35. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments–
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
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year period of the GATT system,36 279 complaints were filed in the first eight 
years alone of the WTO system.37 
Reform meant that two substantive changes occurred in the WTO judicial 
system. First, judicial action became more automatic. A consensus is now 
required to block the establishment of a panel,38 the adoption of a report,39 or an 
authorization of retaliation for continued noncompliance40—a reversal of the 
former rule that required a consensus to move through each of these stages. Of 
course, complainants would not agree to block the establishment of a panel they 
are demanding, and prevailing parties would not block the adoption of 
favorable panel reports. 
Second, the reform led to the creation of a judicial body to which nations 
could appeal panel reports—the WTO Appellate Body. This body’s mandate is 
formally limited to the review of legal findings made by panels, given the facts 
established by the panel.41 The Appellate Body has seven members, chosen by 
the WTO’s Members at large, and appeals are heard by a subset of three of the 
seven members. 
To what extent are the decisions of the WTO Appellate Body indicative of 
binding delegation? As a matter of international law, there is a legal obligation 
to comply with their decisions.42 But as a matter of domestic law, few if any 
national legal systems give direct effect to Appellate Body decisions.43 As a 
matter of domestic law, sovereignty has not been “delegated” to the Appellate 
Body. Therefore, behaviorally, compliance is a domestic political decision, 
analyzed in greater detail below. 
The preceding analysis of the negotiating history behind the move to 
legalization of GATT/WTO dispute resolution suggests that it was not intended 
to lead to expansive judicial lawmaking. The switch to automatic dispute-
resolution and the establishment of the Appellate Body were seen by the 
United States as an opportunity to foster implementation of and compliance 
 
 36. Busch and Reinhardt count 654 disputes filed from 1948 through June 2002. Busch & 
Reinhardt, supra note 24, at 462. From the date of the WTO’s establishment through June 2000, 202 
disputes were initiated. See World Trade Organization, Chronological List Of Disputes Cases, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). See also 
Kara Leitner & Simon Lester, WTO Dispute Settlement 1995–2003: A Statistical Analysis, 7 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 169 (2004). 
 37. Each of these 279 disputes is listed chronologically in World Trade Organization, supra note 36. 
 38. DSU, supra note 35, art. 6(1). 
 39. Id. arts. 16(4), 2(4). 
 40. Id. art. 22(7). 
 41. Id. art. 17(6). 
 42. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 61–64. 
 43. See Inge Govaere, The Reception of the WTO Agreement in the European Union: The Legacy 
of GATT, in REGIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 703, 707 (Paul 
Demaret, Jean-Francois Bellis & Gonzalo García-Jiménez eds., 1997) (suggesting that GATT/WTO 
law has almost no direct effect in the law of the European Union and its Member States); Richard H. 
Steinberg, Direct Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements in the United States, in REGIONALISM 
AND MULTILATERALISM AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 715, 723 (Paul Demaret, Jean-Francois Bellis 
& Gonzalo García-Jiménez eds., 1997) (“The GATT 1947 and the Uruguay Round Agreements, 
including the GATT 1994, have had only limited direct effects in US law.”). 
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with the deals struck in the legislative process—even if those deals were not 
optimally efficient, and even if they were not considered equitable. The dispute-
settlement process was intended to fulfill that purpose by offering a neutral 
judicial process to enforce the WTO agreements. The United States was willing, 
and remains willing, to delegate to WTO dispute settlement the authority to 
enforce the WTO “contract.” The U.S. government may win a few cases, and it 
may lose a few, but WTO dispute-settlement losses are of little consequence if 
the overall effect of the system is to help enforce substantive agreements 
supported by the United States.44 Hence, to the extent that it is performed 
effectively, the judicial function helps reinforce political support for the WTO 
by powerful countries. Furthermore, from the U.S. perspective, the DSU is a 
vehicle by which the U.S. government may legitimately challenge WTO-
inconsistent practices by foreign governments, and it has simultaneously helped 
solve America’s credibility problem arising from unilateralism. From the U.S. 
government’s perspective, the radical judicial reforms of the Uruguay Round 
represented not a multilateralization of U.S. unilateralism, but an 
Americanization of the GATT/WTO dispute-settlement process. The WTO 
dispute-settlement system was not intended as some new form of delegation (in 
the sense of delegating sovereignty de facto), and certainly it was not construed 
as binding (in the sense of delegating sovereignty de jure). The United States 
could always refuse to comply with an Appellate Body report, if inconvenient. 
C. Understanding Judicial Lawmaking—and Its Limits45 
Few, if any, architects of increased legalization at the WTO foresaw the 
institutional development that would follow. Many scholars have suggested that 
judges may behave strategically and favor increasing their own authority,46 yet 
few Uruguay Round negotiators anticipated or intended the Appellate Body to 
engage in lawmaking.47 As suggested above, U.S. policymakers expected that 
 
 44. See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 250 (2004) (arguing that politics is the tightest constraint 
on judicial lawmaking at the WTO, and that political constraint is unlikely to operate unless such 
lawmaking changes the fundamental balance of WTO rights and responsibilities favored by powerful 
states). 
 45. See id. for a more detailed statement of the arguments in this section. 
 46. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 73–76 (1993); John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of 
Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565, 581–82 (1992); Erik Voeten, The Politics of 
International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, INT’L ORG. 
(forthcoming 2008). 
 47. Interview with A. Jane Bradley, former chief U.S. dispute-settlement negotiator and Assistant 
USTR for Enforcement, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2007); Interview with Kenneth Freiberg, USTR 
Deputy Gen. Counsel, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 2007). According to Bradley and Freiberg, a handful 
of lawyers in the USTR’s General Counsel’s office were concerned about judicial lawmaking, but those 
at the political level in both Washington and Brussels were persuaded by the clarity of the WTO 
agreements and by the mandate of DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2 that neither panels nor the Appellate 
Body could add to nor diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. 
Interviews with A. Jane Bradley & Kenneth Freiberg, supra. U.S. Senator Bob Dole was concerned 
enough about judicial lawmaking that he proposed establishing a commission to review the decisions 
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the new dispute-settlement system panelists and Appellate Body members 
would apply WTO rules to cases presented before them—not make law. 
As in domestic legal systems, rules and principles guiding the interpretation 
of public international law permitted the Appellate Body to take a range of 
interpretive stances: at one extreme, a restrained interpretive stance that avoids 
opportunities to make law and is highly deferential to the express consent of 
states; at the other extreme, an expansive interpretive stance that is less 
deferential to state consent, favors dynamic interpretation of treaty provisions, 
and expands upon terms and gaps. Largely in the interests of completeness, 
coherence, and internal consistency of WTO law, the Appellate Body chose a 
more expansive stance on both the question whether to interpret and on the 
method used for interpretation. The resulting judicial decisions have created an 
expansive body of new law. 
WTO judicial lawmaking has two dimensions: filling gaps and clarifying 
ambiguities. Gap-filling refers to judicial lawmaking on a question for which 
there is no legal text directly on point, whereas ambiguity clarification refers to 
judicial lawmaking on a question for which there is legal text that needs 
clarification.48 
First, the DSU’s silence on many procedural questions has been seen by 
some as an invitation to the Appellate Body to make procedural rules. In some 
cases, the Appellate Body has created law that fills procedural gaps in WTO 
agreements, even though the gaps resulted from sharp disagreement among 
WTO members about how to fill them. For example, the Appellate Body 
decided—without clear guidance from WTO agreements—that dispute-
settlement panels could consider amicus curiae briefs submitted by nonstate 
actors.49 In so ruling, the Appellate Body relied on general language in DSU 
Article 13.1, which provides that “[e]ach panel shall have the right to seek 
information and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems 
appropriate.”50 Regardless of the merits on the question, the Appellate Body’s 
interpretation of Article 13 was made in the context of several years of north–
south deadlock on the question whether to permit amicus briefs; few developing 
countries would have consented to an agreement with that outcome, yet the 
Appellate Body chose to interpret the DSU as supporting it. 
Similarly, the Appellate Body established that private lawyers may 
represent WTO Members in oral proceedings, despite European Community 
 
and behavior of the Appellate Body, but only twelve co-sponsors joined him in support of the proposal, 
and it never passed the Senate. See generally WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act, S. 16, 
104th Cong. (1995) (establishing a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission to review dispute-
settlement reports of the WTO’s Appellate Body). 
 48. Ultimately, the distinction between gap-filling and ambiguity clarification may be fragile, but 
the distinction is respected here out of convention. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
(1961). 
 49. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, paras. 79–91, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.—Shrimp–Turtle], available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58ABR.doc. 
 50. DSU, supra note 35, art. 13(1). 
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(EC) and U.S. opposition on grounds that the practice from the earliest years of 
the GATT was to permit presentations in dispute-settlement proceedings 
“exclusively by government lawyers or government trade experts.”51 The 
Appellate Body acted at odds with nearly fifty years of GATT practice, 
reasoning that “nothing in the Marrakesh Agreement [—the Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations—] . . . nor in customary international law or the prevailing practice 
of international tribunals . . . prevents a WTO Member from determining the 
composition of its delegation in Appellate Body proceedings.”52 At the panel 
stage, this practice of permitting participation by nongovernment lawyers was 
subsequently adopted.53 
Second, the WTO Appellate Body has engaged repeatedly in a form of 
lawmaking by which it has given specific meaning to ambiguous treaty 
language. Such clarifications may cause a negative political reaction by WTO 
Members or nongovernmental stakeholders that engaged in behavior within a 
range of possible meanings. For example, in U.S.—Shrimp–Turtle, the 
Appellate Body decided whether the United States could rely on GATT Article 
XX(g) to ban the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products from 
WTO Members that did not maintain laws guaranteeing particular methods of 
protecting endangered sea turtles in the process of shrimp fishing.54 GATT 
Article XX(g) excepts certain measures from the GATT’s affirmative 
obligations that are necessary for the “conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources,”55 but the provision is ambiguously silent on the question of whether 
such exhaustible natural resources must be located within the jurisdiction of the 
country invoking the exception. Earlier decisions, which suggested that they 
must, catalyzed enormous debate between the members. The Appellate Body 
offered a dynamic interpretation of the conditions under which the GATT 
Article XX(g) exception for conservation of exhaustible natural resources could 
be invoked, stating that it must be read “in the light of contemporary concerns 
of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the 
environment.”56 After concluding that the measures in question fell within the 
meaning of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body interpreted the chapeau to 
Article XX and established at least five specific factors that would apply in 
considering whether a measure contravenes the terms of the chapeau.57 Some of 
the factors had no textual lineage (for example, whether the respondent’s 
 
 51. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, paras. 9–10, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). 
 52. Id. at para. 10. 
 53. See Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, para. 14.9, 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org/ 
English/tratop_e/dispu_e/54r00.pdf. 
 54. See U.S.—Shrimp–Turtle, supra note 49, at paras. 20–28. 
 55. Id. at para. 126 (quoting GATT, supra note 15, art. XX(g)). 
 56. Id. at para. 129. 
 57. Id. at paras. 150–86. 
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actions have an “intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy 
decisions made by . . . Members of the WTO”).58 In short, the Appellate Body 
ruling provided an approach to balancing trade–environment issues, despite 
WTO Members’ decade-long deadlock about how to achieve balance on the 
question. 
Third, in a number of instances, the Appellate Body has given precise and 
narrow meaning to language intentionally left vague by negotiators, either 
because they could not agree on more specific language, or in order to permit a 
range of alternative behaviors or national practices. For example, in three 
decisions, the Appellate Body fleshed out the causation analysis to be used in 
safeguards cases,59 which Uruguay Round negotiators had intentionally left 
ambiguous.60 In the U.S.—Lamb Meat case, for example, the Appellate Body 
established an affirmative requirement that national authorities analyze not 
only the nature but also the “extent” of causes other than those prompting the 
safeguards investigation so as to not attribute injury from other causes to 
imports subject to the investigation.61 The Appellate Body took a similar 
approach in the anti-dumping context.62 In a more recent cause celebre in 
Washington, the Appellate Body overturned a longstanding domestic practice 
of “zeroing”63—a practice by which the U.S. Commerce Department, when 
calculating how much product had been dumped, would ignore (or set at zero) 
examples in which the imported product had a negative dumping margin (that 
is, the product was sold for a higher price in the United States than in the 
domestic market).64 Despite an EU–U.S. informal understanding to permit the 
continuation of this practice and the consequent exclusion of this topic from the 
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, the Appellate Body ruled that zeroing was 
 
 58. Id. at para. 161. 
 59. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, paras. 208–17, WT/DS202/AB/R (Feb. 15, 
2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/202abr_e.pdf; Appellate Body Report, 
United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New 
Zealand and Australia, paras. 166–69, WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001) [hereinafter 
U.S.—Lamb Meat], available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/178ABR.doc; 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from 
the European Communities, paras. 76–78, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/166abr_e.pdf. 
 60. Interview with Tim Reif, Democratic Chief Trade Counsel, U.S. House Comm. on Ways and 
Means, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2002). In the Uruguay Round negotiations, U.S. negotiators refused 
to agree to a test that would require national authorities to quantify the relative effects of imports and 
other factors on domestic industry. In so refusing, the U.S. negotiators intended to enable the 
International Trade Commission to continue using its qualitative approach to analyze the “substantial 
cause” question in safeguards cases. 
 61. U.S.—Lamb Meat, supra note 59, at paras. 105–06. 
 62. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-
Rolled Steel Products from Japan, paras. 226–28, WT/DS184/AB/R (July 24, 2001), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/184abr_e.pdf. 
 63. Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating 
Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), para. 263, WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 2006) [hereinafter U.S.—
Zeroing], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/294abr_e.pdf. 
 64. Id. at para. 173 n.286. 
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illegal.65 The U.S. government and commentators have identified several other 
cases in which the Appellate Body or the dispute-settlement panels have given 
a specific and narrow interpretation of language in WTO agreements that was 
intended, by at least some of its negotiators, to be ambiguous and to permit a 
range of national practices.66 Decisions like these might enhance efficiency,67 but 
they are certain to engender negative political reactions in countries that 
intended to consent to broader interpretations. 
Finally, conflict between GATT/WTO texts (or between text and GATT 
practice) may create ambiguity. In a handful of cases, the Appellate Body has 
read language across agreements cumulatively in a way that has generated an 
expansive set of legal obligations. Perhaps most controversially, the Appellate 
Body ruled that national authorities imposing a safeguards measure must 
demonstrate the existence of “unforeseen developments.”68 In a 1951 case, a 
GATT Working Party agreed that the application of Article XIX safeguards 
measures could be based on an argument that an unexpected degree of change 
in consumer tastes that increased imports constituted demonstration of 
“unforeseen developments.”69 Given this implicitly broad interpretation of the 
phrase, which would seem to allow almost any increase in imports to constitute 
“unforeseen developments,” subsequent GATT panels did not require national 
authorities to demonstrate “unforeseen developments” prior to imposing 
safeguards measures. Moreover, the WTO Safeguards Agreement makes no 
reference to a requirement to demonstrate “unforeseen developments,”70 and 
the negotiators of the Agreement expressly considered and rejected inclusion of 
any such requirement.71 The cumulation of GATT practice, relevant texts, and 
negotiating history created an ambiguity over whether “unforeseen 
developments” must be demonstrated in safeguards cases. Focusing on GATT 
 
 65. Id. at para. 263. 
 66. See U.S. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH STRATEGY REGARDING WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANELS AND THE APPELLATE BODY: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
TRANSMITTED BY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 7–10 (2002), available at 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/ReporttoCongress.pdf. See generally CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, 
SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2001); Daniel 
K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-
Dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109 (2002). 
 67. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT 
“Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991). 
 68. U.S.—Lamb Meat, supra note 59, at para. 197. See also Appellate Body Report, Argentina—
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, para. 151, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/121ABR.doc. 
 69. Report of the Intersessional Working Party on the Complaint of Czechoslovakia Concerning the 
Withdrawal by the United States of a Concession under the Terms of Article XIX, paras. 11–12, 
GATT/CP/106 (Mar. 27, 1951) (adopted Oct. 22, 1951), available at http://sul-
derivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSNID=90310003&mediaType=application/pdf. 
 70. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (1994), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf. 
 71. Interview with Tim Reif, former USTR Associate General Counsel and member of the U.S. 
delegation that negotiated the Agreement on Safeguards, in D.C. (May 2005). 
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Article XIX:1(a), the Appellate Body read all of the relevant GATT/WTO law 
and practice cumulatively so as to conclude that a demonstration of 
“unforeseen developments” must be shown if a safeguards measure is to be 
applied.72 
D. The Expansiveness of Judicial Lawmaking: The GATT and WTO 
Compared 
Several indicators suggest that judicial lawmaking is more expansive in the 
WTO than in the GATT. Compare, for example, discussions about judicial 
lawmaking among DSU negotiators in the GATT Uruguay Round to 
discussions among DSU negotiators in the WTO’s current Doha Round. 
Analysis of publicly available notes by the secretariat concerning the Uruguay 
Round Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement indicate no instance in which 
a negotiator suggested that GATT dispute-settlement panels were activist or 
engaged in expansive lawmaking.73 Although Uruguay Round preparatory 
materials are incomplete, the leading secondary history of the Uruguay Round 
DSU negotiations nowhere mentions any discussion of activism or lawmaking 
by GATT panels.74 Finally, interviews with lawyers from the USTR identify only 
four GATT panel reports criticized by contracting parties as instances of overly 
broad lawmaking or inappropriate interpretation.75 
In contrast, analysis of publicly available official documents of the current 
Doha Round Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, which convenes in 
Special Sessions of the DSB, indicates that in the first eighteen months of 
negotiations—by June 2003—concern about instances of or proposed solutions 
 
 72. U.S.—Lamb Meat, supra note 59, at paras. 69–72 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea—
Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, para. 85, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 
14, 1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/98ABR.doc. 
 73. Judicial lawmaking was raised several times in the Uruguay Round dispute-settlement 
negotiations, but in all of those instances, participants were expressing a preference that prospective 
changes to the dispute-settlement system should not create, by constructive interpretation, obligations 
that were not established in the texts of GATT/WTO agreements. See, e.g., GATT Secretariat, 
Summary and Comparative Analysis of Proposals for Negotiations, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/14/Rev.2 
(June 22, 1988), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92050053.pdf; GATT 
Secretariat, Meeting of 25 June 1987, MTN.GNG/NG13/2 (July 15, 1987), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92020218.pdf. 
 74. See, e.g., JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND (1995). 
 75. Interviews with A. Jane Bradley & Kenneth Freiberg, supra note 47 (identifying the following 
reports: Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS29/R (June 16, 
1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/ 
SULPDF/91790155.pdf; Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
WT/DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91530924.pdf; Report of the Panel, Canada—Measures 
Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, L/5863, 1985 WL 291500 (Sept. 17, 1985) (unadopted) (Canada agreed 
with certain parts of the report and rescinded the tax but blocked adoption of the report because it 
disagreed with findings relating to the MFN principle); Report of the Panel, United States Tax 
Legislation (DISC), Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 98 (1977), available at 
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90930121.pdf (the United States permitting its 
adoption only in conjunction with a Contracting Parties decision, the substance of which was negotiated 
between the EC and the United States, interpreting various points of GATT law)). 
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to judicial lawmaking by WTO panels or the Appellate Body had been raised 
seventy-seven times by representatives of fifty-five WTO Members (including 
the EC and the United States), focusing on at least ten dispositive WTO 
dispute-settlement reports adopted in the WTO’s first eight years.76 Moreover, 
confidential notes on meetings of the DSU Reform Group, in which 
ambassadors representing approximately ten WTO Members have met 
regularly to informally discuss concerns about operation of the DSU, reveal 
that judicial lawmaking was discussed at almost every meeting during the period 
for which the notes are available.77 
Consider journal articles on the subject. Of 110 selected U.S. and Canadian 
law-journal articles on GATT dispute settlement published from 1982 through 
1994 (the last year of the GATT system),78 only two suggest cases in which 
controversial, expansive, or activist judicial lawmaking might have taken place.79 
In contrast, at least fifty-one articles published in similarly selected U.S. and 
Canadian law journals in the first eight years of the WTO discuss controversial, 
expansive, or activist judicial lawmaking or cases in the WTO.80 
This expansive interpretive stance by the Appellate Body is not without 
limits. It is constrained by politics. For example, powerful members, particularly 
the EC and the United States, have had a de facto veto over the appointment of 
 
 76. See generally Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Proposal of the Africa 
Group in the WTO, para. 2 (Oct. 2002) (on file with authors); Special Session of the Dispute Settlement 
Body, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre William Rappard on 17–18 February 2003, TN/DS/M/9 
(July 1, 2003); Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre 
William Rappard on 28–30 January 2003, TN/DS/M/8 (June 30, 2003); Special Session of the Dispute 
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre William Rappard on 16–18 December 2002, 
TN/DS/M/7 (June 26, 2003); Dispute Settlement Body—Special Session, Special Session of the Dispute 
Settlement Body—Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Péter Balás, to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, TN/DS/9 (June 6, 2003); Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of 
Meeting—Held in the Centre William Rappard on 13 – 15 November 2002, TN/DS/M/6 (Mar. 31 2003); 
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre William 
Rappard on 14 October 2002, TN/DS/M/5 (Feb. 27, 2003); Special Session of the Dispute Settlement 
Body, Minutes of Meeting—Held in the Centre William Rappard on 10 September 2002, TN/DS/M/4 
(Nov. 6, 2002); Settlement Body—Special Session, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding—Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania 
and Zimbabwe, TN/DS/W/18 (Oct. 7, 2002); Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes 
of Meeting—Held in the Centre William Rappard on 15 July 2002, TN/DS/M/3 (Sept. 9, 2002); Dispute 
Settlement Body—Special Session, Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to Transparency—Communication from the United 
States, TN/DS/W/13 (Aug. 22, 2002). 
 77. Confidential notes on meetings of the informal DSU Reform Group from Oct. 22, 1998–Sept. 
24, 1999, provided to the author by a senior trade official (Apr. 2002) (on file with authors). 
 78. These articles were selected by searching the Lexis-Nexis database of “US & Canadian Law 
Reviews, Combined” on Feb. 7, 2004, for articles that mentioned “GATT” at least ten times and 
“dispute settlement” at least five times. 
 79. Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly 
Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 751, 788 (1994); Daniel 
A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory States: A GATT’s-Eye View of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1408–09 (1994). 
 80. These figures are based on the author’s review of articles selected by searching the Lexis-Nexis 
database of “US & Canadian Law Reviews, Combined” on Feb. 7, 2004, for articles that mentioned 
“WTO” at least ten times and “dispute settlement” at least five times. 
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Appellate Body members: in the WTO’s early years, these powerful members 
engaged in a comparatively cursory review of Appellate Body nominees; in 
more recent years, as the Appellate Body’s capacity to make law became 
apparent, the United States began engaging in a thorough review and interview 
of Appellate Body nominees, blocking the appointment of some nominees who 
were seen as too activist.81 Similarly, members are not shy about complaining 
when the Appellate Body engages in lawmaking they dislike, and proposals by 
powerful members to rewrite parts of the DSU in the Doha Round may have 
had a sobering effect on the Appellate Body. Loud public claims that the 
Appellate Body is engaged in “activism” raise the possibility that WTO judicial 
lawmaking could become a mass politics issue. To some extent, agent slack is 
limited. 
E. Implications of WTO Judicial Action 
Three key points can be derived from WTO case law. First, judicial action is 
a substitute for legislative action. Under the guise of interpretation, the 
Appellate Body has legislated rules for regime members. Of course, as shown 
below, judicial lawmaking differs in form, rate, and substance from negotiated 
lawmaking, so they are imperfect substitutes. 
Second, in just about all cases, Appellate Body interpretations have favored 
more openness, which is its preference.82 The observation that the dispute-
settlement system favors openness is intuitive: in all cases, complainants 
advance interpretations of WTO agreements that challenge a respondent’s 
trade barrier, and respondents argue for interpretations that would permit the 
maintenance of the barrier. If the complainant wins even some of the cases, the 
result is more open trade. For WTO cases initiated before 2001, eighty-nine 
percent of the 152 dispositive reports held that at least one of the national 
measures at issue was WTO-inconsistent.83 Qualitative assessments of Appellate 
Body decision, such as those by Daniel Tarullo, have also shown a liberalizing 
bias.84 This liberal bias is particularly apparent in cases that have increasingly 
reigned in the use of anti-dumping duties, countervailing measures, and 
safeguards measures, and—more recently—in successful challenges to the 
maintenance of agricultural protection and subsidization measures.85 
 
 81. Interview with A. Jane Bradley, supra note 47; Interview with Dorothy Dwoskin, Assistant 
USTR for Multilateral Affairs, in Washington, D.C. (May 2005). 
 82. See Tarullo, supra note 66, at 168. Complainants win almost ninety percent of all dispute-
settlement cases. This win rate may be explained by a combination of asymmetric information and the 
cost of bringing a case, rather than by the political leanings of the tribunal. Nevertheless, this high win 
rate it is consistent with other evidence, presented above, suggesting a bias toward liberalization. 
 83. See Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 24. 
 84. See generally Tarullo, supra note 66. 
 85. For example, a liberal bias has been apparent in WTO rulings against the EC’s banana regime, 
beef hormones directive, subsidization of sugar, and restrictions on GMOs and against U.S. trade-
remedy laws (particularly those used to protect steel) and cotton subsidies. See Panel Report, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
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Third, judicial activism occurs in the shadow of power politics, both between 
nations and within nations. The Appellate Body is not ignoring the interests of 
the membership: it often acts to induce behaviors that are consistent with the 
interests of members but are politically difficult to implement at home. 
III 
UNDERSTANDING TRADE DELEGATION AND COMPLIANCE 
Why do nations comply with a policy that moves trade in a liberal direction, 
even when inconvenient, given the absence of de jure delegation? In only about 
one out of twenty dispositive WTO cases has a losing party been held to have 
failed to comply within a “reasonable period.”86 This ninety-five percent 
approximate rate of compliance with judicial decisions would be respectable in 
most national legal systems. That it persists in an international legal context, 
which many describe as anarchic, may be surprising. This compliance rate is 
particularly impressive, given that compliance with WTO dispute-settlement 
decisions typically involves political defeat of historically powerful and 
intransigent protectionist sectors. Why does the WTO dispute-settlement 
system enjoy such a high compliance rate? 
The essence of the mechanics by which the dispute-settlement system enjoys 
such a high compliance rate is rooted in decentralized enforcement—a 
legitimized retaliatory threat that reconfigures domestic politics in the 
contravening country. At the interstate level of analysis, when ruled against, a 
WTO Member is expected to comply within a “reasonable period of time” 
(which may be determined by WTO binding arbitration).87 If the member does 
not, the adversely affected complainant can retaliate. Retaliation takes the form 
of raising tariffs on goods originating in the territory of the contravening 
country to a level intended to have the effect of eliminating demand for the 
imports in proportion to the adverse effect of the contravening measures. 
At the domestic politics level, the potency of this mechanism becomes clear. 
The dispute-settlement system provides national leaders with a way to get 
 
news06_e/291r_e.htm; Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Export Subsidies on Sugar, 
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/283ABR.doc; Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/267abr_e.pdf; Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). 
 86. This figure was approximated as of Aug. 31, 2007, by dividing the total number of dispositive 
WTO dispute-settlement rulings holding a Member in contravention of a WTO obligation by the 
number of cases in which a WTO Member has been found in noncompliance with such a ruling 
pursuant to DSU Article 21. This calculation is an approximation because it is possible (although rare) 
that a Member has failed to comply but that the successful complainant was compensated by the 
contravening Member or otherwise decided not to pursue the matter under DSU Articles 21 and 22. 
For the list of information upon which this calculation rests, see World Trade Organization, supra note 
36. 
 87. DSU, supra note 35, art. 21(3). 
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around domestic pressures to keep the market closed. The potential of 
retaliation is an important means to motivate exporters who would be hurt by 
the threatened sanction. Since countries publish a list of products that will be 
affected by the sanction,88 this has the effect of pitting those politically powerful, 
export-oriented producers against the industry that champions the contravening 
measures. If targeted smartly, the proposed retaliation list mobilizes sufficient 
political muscle within the contravening country to result in WTO-consistent 
reform. In this way, the DSU works in conjunction with domestic laws, 
regulations, and politics to foster compliance with the legislative outcomes that 
are codified in the WTO agreements.89 
Illustrating the range of political preferences within the United States 
suggests why compliance should be expected with most, but not all, WTO 
decisions.90 Figure 1 below provides the traditional organization of trade-policy 
preferences in the United States. A couple of assumptions underlie this 
distribution of preferences. First, although both exporters and import-
competing groups—firms and labor—influence Washington policy, the latter 
groups, which face a certain and substantial loss from liberalization, are more 
likely to get around collective action costs and to voice their preferences to 
Congress than the former. Thus, the preferences of Congress are aligned more 
closely with those of the latter group. Second, the size of the constituency has a 
significant effect on the trade-policy preferences for elected officials. Export-
oriented producers are more likely than import-competing producers to be 
geographically dispersed; a high proportion of local production is consumed 
locally. By that logic, which has been demonstrated empirically, import-
competing producers wield more influence over smaller electoral districts than 
do larger producers.91 Hence, the House is less free-trade oriented than is the 
Senate, and they are both more prone to trade closure than is the President. 
Finally, since all dispute-settlement bodies include non-Americans, the 
assumption is that, across cases in which the United States is a respondent, 
dispute-settlement panelist and Appellate Body preferences will be more pro-
liberalization than those of any U.S. domestic actor, except export interests. 
 
 
 88. In the United States, the government publishes a proposed retaliation list in the Federal 
Register thirty days prior to the effective date of retaliation. 
 89. See generally Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and 
Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603 (2000). 
 90. This analysis is consistent with that presented by Epstein and O’Halloran in this volume. See 
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Sovereignty and Delegation in International Organizations, 71 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (Winter 2008). However, we consider the interaction as only a two-party 
game—the United States interacting with the WTO. The interests of the WTO are assumed to be fixed 
and for free trade the preferences of the United States are as suggested in Figure 1, which could lead to 
a range of possible policy outcomes. 
 91. See Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Roots of American 
Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade, 49 WORLD POL. 309, 328–29 (1997); Michael 
Hiscox, The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization, 53 INT’L ORG. 
669, 687–89 (1999). 
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In the diagram above, the continuum ranges from no liberalization on the 
left to liberalization on the right. I represents the ideal point of import-
competing groups, and SQ represents the status quo. The ideal positions on 
liberalization (whether through negotiation or other means) of a majority of the 
House, a majority of the Senate, and the President are represented by H, S and 
P, respectively. AB is the preference of the Appellate Body, and E represents 
export interests. AB and E have general preferences favoring trade 
liberalization, not preferences in any particular case or with respect to any 
particular industry. The win set for each actor is established as an arc, with each 
actor’s ideal point equidistant from the status quo (on the left) and an increase 
of liberalization (on the right) beyond which the actor would prefer reversion to 
the status quo. 
Given contemporary procedures for negotiated trade liberalization, such as 
those established under current Trade Promotion Authority, the President 
proposes a trade deal initialed in Geneva. That negotiated deal, however, must 
be acceptable to both the House and the Senate. A new policy will be 
acceptable to all if it falls within that small circle centered on the House. In this 
scenario, the President proposes a position at his ideal point and Congress 
agrees. The dot on the line above P represents this outcome. 
Now consider the situation when a matter is litigated. Eventually, the 
Appellate Body makes a decision. As long as it rules within the preference 
space represented by the arrow, the United States should comply with the 
ruling. Why would the President not prefer a position at his ideal point and so 
reject the Appellate Body’s ruling? In practice, if the President were to respond 
by proposing his ideal point, Congress would bargain with him. The outcome, 
which would be in the absence of agenda control by the Appellate Body, would 
likely be closer to the Congress’s ideal than to the President’s. In such a world, 
the President has an interest in giving the Appellate Body agenda control, and 
Congress will not object, as long as the outcome is within the win-set that 
centers on the House. 
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This model is suggested only as a simple illustration. Its central point is that 
it is not counterintuitive to have the U.S. President go along with liberalization 
efforts by the Appellate Body, and similarly, for Congress not to object to this 
judicial liberalization. Given this very rudimentary model of domestic 
preferences, such liberalization may be an outcome that everyone sees as 
superior to the status quo. 
Five additional observations, none of which should be surprising, derive 
from this simple diagram. First, the President may be able to move outside the 
House’s and Senate’s respective win-sets and liberalize further than Congress 
would like, if compliance can be achieved by a regulatory change or sole 
executive action (such as an Executive Order). In those cases in which 
compliance can be achieved by liberalizing without an affirmative act of 
Congress, the President has considerable freedom to do what the Appellate 
Body prescribes. However, the President cannot accommodate the Appellate 
Body by liberalizing so much that he catalyzes veto-proof action by both the 
House and the Senate. Empirically, in many cases, the United States has 
complied (partly or fully) with an Appellate Body decision through sole 
executive action that arguably went further than the House (or Congress) 
would have preferred, including U.S.—Shrimp–Turtle,92 U.S.—Lamb Meat,93 
and United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton.94 
Second, the Appellate Body must engage in some compromise and 
accommodation to enjoy compliance, particularly when U.S. compliance 
requires an act of Congress. If Congressional action is required for compliance, 
then the United States will comply only if the prescribed action is within the 
House’s win-set. Assuming that the Appellate Body prefers substantially more 
liberalization than the House, such that its ideal point resides outside the 
House’s win-set, the Appellate Body will need to offer compromise opinions. 
Empirically, the Appellate Body has offered such politically sensitive reports in 
several cases. For example, in U.S.—Shrimp–Turtle,95 the Appellate Body could 
have limited the jurisdictional scope of GATT Article XX(g), which might have 
created conflicts between GATT and various multilateral environmental 
agreements, and would certainly have angered environmentalists and members 
of Congress, but it evaded the question. In several cases the Appellate Body has 
embraced the doctrine of judicial economy,96 thereby limiting the scope of 
judicial lawmaking and enhancing the prospects for compliance. 
Third, the model may be used to suggest longitudinal change. The dispute-
settlement process can move policy toward liberalization by influencing the 
 
 92. U.S.—Shrimp–Turtle, supra note 49. 
 93. U.S.—Lamb Meat, supra note 59. 
 94. Appellate Body Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 
2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/267abr_e.pdf. 
 95. U.S.—Shrimp–Turtle, supra note 49. 
 96. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool 
Shirts and Blouses from India, § VI, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/us-woolshirts(ab).pdf. 
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number and type of groups on the left side of the continuum. Once liberalized 
and faced with competition, import-competing firms and jobs disappear. Once 
gone, the political landscape shifts. House, Senate, and Presidential preferences 
may shift to the right. In this sense, Appellate Body rulings can have direct 
effects on U.S. politics. 
The existence of international delegation, however, does not imply an 
inevitable move toward openness. Competition may lead to a changing number 
of actors on either side of the continuum. With the growth of competition at 
home, more firms are likely to find themselves aligning on the left, stopping any 
attempt to open the U.S. market; likewise, the growth of export opportunities, 
or the threat of retaliation, will mobilize exporters on the right-hand side and 
could move policy in that direction. In the end, it is the preferences of U.S. 
industries that will move policy in one direction or the other, no matter the 
degree of delegation to the WTO dispute-settlement system. 
Fourth, the model shows how some contemporary U.S. statutes have moved 
U.S. trade policy in a more open direction by shifting authority over trade 
matters from Congress to the executive branch. Prior to 1974, the implementing 
legislation for comprehensive trade agreements originated in the House (as 
required by the Constitution), then went to the Senate, then to the President for 
signature. As Figure 1 suggests, with the House acting as the agenda-setter, the 
Senate and then the President were presented with legislation that was at the 
more closed end of the spectrum. “Fast-track” negotiating authority in the 
Trade Act of 1974 and subsequent statutes, as well as the current Trade 
Promotion Authority, have provided the President with an opportunity to 
propose a trade agreement and implementing legislation to Congress, which 
could not amend the agreement or the legislation, requiring Congress to accept 
or reject the package by an up-or-down vote. By shifting agenda-setting 
authority to the President, these mechanisms have moved U.S. trade policy in a 
more open direction.97 
Finally, the model may roughly suggest the extent to which the Appellate 
Body may successfully push for trade openness when considering measures 
maintained by non-U.S. domestic political systems. For example, the model 
suggests that the Appellate Body may successfully push an authoritarian system 
further than the United States toward the trade-openness end of the spectrum 
because authoritarian rulers do not need to deal with an effective legislative 
branch with a more closed orientation. Similarly, the model may indicate that 
the Appellate Body faces the opposite situation when addressing EU trade 
measures: the Commission is up against multiple veto points, giving it and the 
Appellate Body relatively little leeway to push Europe toward greater 
openness. In the end, the success of this and all international courts may well be 
 
 97. See, e.g., Bailey, Goldstein & Weingast, supra note 91, at 314; Judith Goldstein, International 
Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws, 50 INT’L ORG. 541, 
559–60 (1996). 
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determined as much by their willingness to act strategically as by the wisdom of 
their rulings in any particular case. 
IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Today, more than at any time in the last sixty years, liberalization is difficult 
and export interests do not necessarily hold sway over powerful private groups 
unwilling to face international competition. Partly because of powerful and 
recalcitrant protectionist sectors, the most optimistic expectation for the Doha 
Round is a minimalist package, modest by contrast to the results of the 
Uruguay Round. As of this writing, the Round has delivered even less. Whereas 
big bundled deals gained majority support in the United States and among 
other power members of the regime during the GATT years, judicial action in 
the WTO since then has come to be an increasingly salient and effective means 
of defeating recalcitrant protectionism. In trade rounds, U.S. steel, sugar, 
cotton, apparel, and other inefficient producers have succeeded for a half 
century in assuring their continued protection: facing certain, devastating losses 
from liberalization, they have remained united in successfully keeping their 
protection off the bargaining table, even if including their liberalization in U.S. 
offers could have helped U.S. export-oriented producers. Liberalization of 
these sectors has been stuck in the mud. 
This outcome is no surprise. From the start, delegation of authority in the 
United States, first from Congress to the President and then from the President 
to a multilateral trade regime, has been a means to get around domestic 
resistance to trade reform. America’s tolerance for de facto delegation to the 
WTO and judicial lawmaking continues to perform that function. 
From the perspective of large democracies, the WTO dispute-settlement 
process is now a highly salient method to keep markets opening, given domestic 
resistance and the difficulties that now accompany multilateral negotiations. In 
broad terms, granting agenda-setting power to the Appellate Body forces 
leaders in member nations to compare the liberalizing stance of the Appellate 
Body in its reports with the status quo; if the Appellate Body has been strategic, 
its overall stance on liberalization will be closer to those of national leaders than 
the status quo. Mechanically, at the end of each individual dispute, the threat of 
retaliation usually pits one of the offending protectionist subsectors against a 
large number of export-oriented interests. If retaliation occurs, certain loss will 
befall the exporters, motivating them to support ending the protection under 
challenge. In the dispute-settlement context, the export-oriented producers, 
who in the legislative context merely had a possible gain, are now threatened 
with a clear and credible loss, motivating them to act decisively against 
protection. This asymmetry—many exporters against a single import-competing 
group—creates the political space that pushes liberalization forward. As long as 
the Appellate Body does not deviate too far from underlying interests in 
member countries, they can rule, countries will comply, and liberalization 
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moves forward—albeit with a Greek chorus of politicians and the public 
complaining about judicial activism and a loss of sovereignty. 
Furthermore, liberalization itself can be self-reinforcing: as groups are 
unable to maintain protection and cannot compete, they “peel” off and become 
less powerful domestic interests.98 To be sure, the Doha Round negotiations 
have increasingly operated under the shadow of the law and politics of these 
liberalizing judicial decisions; in this way, litigation may be feeding back onto 
legislation. In any case, the “judicial liberalization” of WTO judicial action is 
currently a crucial piece of the contemporary WTO liberalization story. 
This important role for the WTO dispute-settlement system is reminiscent 
of the crucial liberalizing role played by the ECJ in the 1960s through the late-
1980s—until the Single European Act.99 In that period, the Council was 
paralyzed by the Luxemburg compromise,100 which effectively required 
unanimity for any important action. The ECJ’s exercise in “negative 
liberalization,” striking down national protectionist measures in such famous 
cases as Rheinheitsgebot101 and Cassis de Dijon,102 is credited with being the main 
engine of internal market liberalization in the period. Moreover, as we have 
argued here about compliance with WTO Appellate Body decisions, domestic 
politics have been crucial to compliance with ECJ decisions.103 Of course, the 
ECJ’s role is distinguishable from that of the WTO Appellate Body in the 
contemporary period: perhaps most significantly, the ECJ established direct 
effect and unqualified supremacy of its decisions in member-state legal systems, 
whereas the Appellate Body has to rely exclusively on the political mechanisms 
described above for compliance. 
As long as this WTO agent supports open trade, the agency relationship will 
lead nations to continue to open up markets. Powerful WTO members like the 
United States will abide by these liberal decisions to the extent that the 
decisions catalyze decisive action by efficient, export-oriented producers and 
 
 98. See Oona A. Hathaway, Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry 
Demands for Protection, 52 INT’L ORG. 575, 584–88 (1998), for a similar argument. 
 99. See Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. 
 100. The Luxembourg Compromise, signed on Jan. 31, 1966, provides, 
In the event of decisions that can be adopted by majority on the proposal of the Commission, 
when very important interests of one or several partners are at stake, the members of the 
Council will attempt, within a reasonable period of time, to arrive at solutions that could be 
adopted by all members of the Council in respect of their mutual interests and those of the 
Community. 
This is considered a “political declaration” by Foreign Ministers and did not amend the Treaty of 
Rome. See Arrangements Made in Luxembourg Between the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Six, Jan. 
31, 1966, 5 I.L.M. 316, 317 [hereinafter Luxembourg Compromise]. 
 101. Case 178/84, Comm’n v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=61984J0178&l
g=en (last visited Feb. 21, 2008) 
 102. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 
649, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEX 
numdoc&lg=en&numdoc=61978J0120 (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
 103. See Karen J. Alter, The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or 
Backlash?, 54 INT’L ORG. 489, 493 (2000); Burley & Mattli, supra note 46, at 62–65. 
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are favored by elites and leaders who still deem openness to be in the national 
interest. 
